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FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION IN NINETEENTH 
CENTURY AMERICA: THE MORMON 
CASES*
Edwin B. Firmage**
The Mormon cases present a fascinating study of diversity and 
conformity in the United States in the nineteenth century. From their 
beginning the Mormons were a gathered people. Almost immedi­
ately, from their origins in New York, the Mormons challenged the 
legal systems in the nation and the states where they resided to pro­
tect or at least tolerate their idiosyncracies. Mormon belief and prac­
tice came to include communal economics, theocratic government, 
and most challenging and offensive of all to the larger national com­
munity, a radically different marital and social practice—polygamous 
marriage.
Mormon history began in New York and continued briefly in 
Ohio where Mormons first gathered. Mormons experienced their 
most savage suppression in Missouri, where the Governor, Lilbum 
Boggs, finally issued an extermination order and the “Mormon war” 
finally saw Mormons driven into Illinois to seek refuge and a new 
community. After the community initially welcomed Mormon refu­
gees, the abrasiveness of a people who were so incapable of assimila­
tion into the existing society led to conflict again, culminating in the 
murder of Joseph Smith, the founder of Mormonism, and his brother 
Hyrum. The Mormon exodus to the Great Basin of the American 
West followed, under the direction of Brigham Young, one of this 
nation’s leading colonizers. But the story of free exercise of religion 
among the Mormons in nineteenth century America had just begun.
* Major parts of the argument of this paper were first presented in the first legal history 
of the Mormon experience, done with my friend and colleague, Professor E. Collin Mangrum 
ZlON IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER- 
day  S ain ts 1830-1900 (University of Illinois Press, 1988), and in Firmage, The Judicial 
Campaign Against Polygamy and the Enduring Legal Questions, 27 BYU S tudies 91 (1988).
Significant portions of this paper were also presented at the Conference on Religious Law 
and Legal Pluralism, sponsored by the Benjamin Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, 
New York, New York, September 17-18, 1989. That paper, entitled Religion and the Law: 
The Mormon Experience in the Nineteenth Century, was published in 12 C ardozo  L. Rev. 
805 (1991).
** Professor of Law, University of Utah College of Law, Brigham Young University; 
J.D., LL.M., J.S.D., University of Chicago. Erik Christiansen, my friend and research assis­
tant, helped edit this paper from my earlier writings.
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I. The Nineteenth Century Climate
Nineteenth-century frontier America was radically different from 
the world we know today. Many Americans, and American courts 
for that matter, thought that Americans shared a common under­
standing of God and religion.1 While they professed a belief in the 
free exercise of religion, many courts assumed that America was a 
Christian country, and more particularly, a Protestant Christian 
country.2 In 1854, for example, the Supreme Court of Maine upheld 
a decision to expel an Irish Catholic child from school for refusing to 
participate in a Protestant religious exercise.3 In 1811, the highest 
state court in New York upheld an indictment for blasphemy and 
stated that “[W]e are a Christian people, and the morality of the 
country is deeply ingrafted upon Christianity.”4 Sunday closing laws 
were also upheld regularly by the majority of state courts5 and by the 
United States Supreme Court.6
This Christian nation attitude permeated the judiciary and sus­
tained the religious views of the majority. In 1843, for example, Jus­
tice Joseph Story, in the famous case of Vidal v. Girard’s Executor,1 
went as far as to assert that Christianity was part of the common law 
of the United States.8 Similarly, after compiling a long list of histori-
1. See, e.g„ North v. Board of Trustees, 137 111. 296, 305, 27 N.E. 54, 59 (1891) (Univer­
sity of Illinois did not violate state constitution in requiring daily chapel exercise, because 
nothing prevents state colleges from adopting “all reasonable regulations for the inculcation of 
moral and religious principles in those attending them.”)
2. See Berman, Religion and Law. The First Amendment in Historical Perspective, 35 
Emory L.J. I l l , 783 (1986); W. Torpey, Ju d ic ia l D o c trin es  o f R elig ious R igh ts in 
A m erica 16 (1948); see also Ferriter v. Tyler, 48 Vt. 444 (1876) (150 Catholic students expelled 
by Protestant school board and not readmitted until they vowed that they would not miss 
school for Catholic religious ceremonies again). But see State ex rel. Weiss v. District School 
Bd., 44 N.W. 967 (Wis. 1890) (Bible readings in state schools banned as violative of state’s 
constitution).
3. See Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379 (1854).
4. People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 295 (N.Y. 1811). For other cases and discussions of 
early blasphemy prosecutions, see L. Levy, Blasphemy in M assachuse tts  (1973); Zeisweiss 
v. James, 63 Pa. 465 (1870); Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. 206 (Mass. 1838); State v. 
Chandler, 2 Harr. 553 (Del. 1838); Upedegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & R. 394 (Pa. 
1832); Delaware v. Chandler, 3 Harr. 553 (1837); W. Torpey, supra note 2, at 58-60.
5. See, e . g Elden v. People, 161 111. 296, 43 N.E. 1108 (1896); Lindenmuller v. People, 
33 Barb. 548 (N.Y. 1861); Missouri v. Ambs, 20 Mo. 214 (1854); Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 
Pa. 312 (1848); Commonwealth v. Wolf, 3 Pa. 48 (Serg. & Rawle) (1817). But see State v. 
Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 15 W.Va. 362 (1879).
6. See, e.g., Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178 (1897); Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 
299 (1896); Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118 (1891); Bucher v. Chesire R.R., 125 U.S. 555 
(1888); Gibbs & Sterret Mfg. Co. v. Brucker, 111 U.S. 595 (1884); Pence v. Langdon, 99 U.S. 
578 (1878).
7. 43 U.S. 127 (1844).
8. Id. at 198.
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cal antecedents, Justice David Brewer, writing Holy Trinity Church v. 
United States9 in 1882 declared: “[T]his is a Christian nation.”10 
Thus, the early Mormon Church had to contend not only with a na­
tional Christian attitude defining America’s religion by popular senti­
ment, but also with a judiciary used to intruding into the most 
sensitive aspects of church-state relations. The result was a judiciary 
with both the power and the impetus to define religion by presently 
existing values.
Prior to the judicial attack on polygamy, the Mormons endured a 
variety of litigation in New York in 1826 and 1830. In each instance, 
Smith was charged with vagrancy in connection with his money-dig­
ging activities.11 Although he was apparently acquitted,12 to avoid 
further harassment Smith left New York and fled to Ohio in February 
1831.13 The litigation that began in New York continued in Ohio. 
Unlike the New York experience, however, the Ohio litigation did not 
stem from the Mormons’ belief in the “Golden Bible,”14 but rather 
from a self-inflicted commercial disaster—the failure of the Kirtland 
Safety Society.
When Ohio failed to grant the Kirtland Safety Society a state 
banking charter, the Saints issued their own notes to pay for large 
quantities of merchandise that had been purchased on credit.15 
Within six months of its formation, however, the financial panic of 
1837 swept the nation, taking down the Society along with thousands 
of other over-subscribed banks.16 The Society episode embarrassed 
Joseph Smith and cost him many of his closest supporters. But with 
the exodus of 1838, Church leadership and the majority of the Saints 
left financial disaster in Ohio only to face militant hostilities in 
Missouri.
9. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
10. Id. at 471.
11. See Walters, Joseph Smith’s Bainbridge, New York Court Trials, W estm inster The­
o lo g ic a l  J. 123, 129 (1974).
12. See 1 J. Smith, H isto ry  o f th e  C h u rch  o f Jesus C h ris t o f L a t te r -d a y  S ain ts 
96 (rev. ed. 1978); R. Bushman, Joseph Smith a n d  th e  Beginnings o f Mormonism 162 
(1984).
13. See 1 J. Smith, supra note 12, at 39-45; 1 B. R oberts, Com prehensive H isto ry  o f 
th e  C h u rch  o f Jesus C h ris t o f L a t te r -d a y  S ain ts 240 (1930).
14. See M. Parkin, Conflict in Kirtland: A Study of the Nature and Causes of External 
and Internal Conflict of the Mormons in Ohio Between 1830 and 1838, 263-73 (M.A. thesis, 
Brigham Young University 1966).
15. See Hanson, Money o f the Mountains, 64 Im provem ent E ra  158, 158-59 (1961).
16. See 1 B. R oberts, supra note 13, at 402; Hill, Rooker & Wimmer, The Kirtland 
Economy Revisited: A Market Critique o f Sectarian Economics, in 3 S tud, in M ormon Hist. 
81 (1977).
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Early Mormons regarded Missouri, specifically Jackson County, 
as the divinely revealed site for the establishment of Zion.17 Soon af­
ter the first Mormons arrived at Independence, Missouri, on January 
13, 1831, however, many of the prominent men of the county entered 
into a “secret constitution” in July 1833.18 On July 20, 1833, the 
pledges of the “secret constitution” gathered at the courthouse in In­
dependence to ask the Mormons to leave Jackson County.19 The 
Mormons, however, declined to leave their appointed place of gather­
ing and violence soon followed.
As the violence escalated, the Mormons sought relief from Mis­
souri Governor Daniel Dunklin on September 28, asking for military 
protection so that they might defend their rights by suing for their 
loss of property.20 The governor, in a response dated October 19, 
1833, advised the Mormons to file civil actions before the local circuit 
judges and justices of the peace.21 The local magistrates, however, 
refused to punish the mob leaders who had demolished and destroyed 
Mormons’ houses and stores, and the violence continued. Finally, af­
ter the Mormons had been driven from their homes and forced to 
escape across the Missouri River on November 7-8,22 a petition con­
taining 114 signatures was sent to President Andrew Jackson.23 The 
petition asked that federal troops restore the Saints to their homes 
and thereafter maintain peace until civil order could be restored. 
President Jackson’s formal reply, however, stated that he had no au­
thority to call out the military to enforce state laws.24
Thereafter, many of the Mormons who fled Jackson County set­
tled in Caldwell County, Missouri. Although the Saints anticipated 
peace in their new settlement, the rapid influx of Mormons agitated 
the local settlers and violence again soon followed.25 This time, how­
ever, as the number of assaults on Mormons increased, the Saints be­
gan to fight back.26 As a result, when reports reached Governor 
Lilbum Boggs that the Mormons were arming themselves and com-
17. See D o c tr in e  & C ovenan ts o f th e  C hurch  o f Jesus C h ris t o f L a t te r -d a y
Saints 57:3 (1981 printing).
18. See 1 J. Smith, supra note 12, at 374-76.
19. Id . at 395-99.
20. Id. at 410-15.
21. Id. at 423-24.
22. Id. at 437.
23. Id. at 483-85.
24. Id. at 493.
25. See 3 J. Smith, supra note 12, at 57.
26. See B. R oberts, The M issouri P ersecu tio n s 214 (1900 & reprint 1965).
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mitting acts of violence, he issued an order of extermination.27 Three 
days after this order was given, on October 30, 1838, eighteen or 
nineteen Mormons, including children, were massacred at Haun’s 
Mill in Caldwell County.28 The following day a mob, led by state 
militia, surrounded the Mormons gathered at Far West in Caldwell 
County, and arrested and imprisoned their leaders.29 Under these 
ominous circumstances and without many of their leaders, the 
Mormons retreated to Quincy, Illinois.
When Church leaders later arrived in Illinois in the spring of 
1839, they realized that efforts to secure redress from either the courts 
or the legislature for the property and lives lost in Missouri were an 
exercise in futility. The Church leadership, therefore, began looking 
elsewhere for money and protection. The Mormons’ first plan of at­
tack was to have the governor of each state petition Congress to im­
peach the State of Missouri for not guaranteeing a republic form of 
government.30 A group of the Church leaders left for Washington in 
October 1839 with a petition claiming redress from the national gov­
ernment.31 The day after their arrival, they were introduced to Presi­
dent Van Buren, who frankly stated that although their cause was 
just, he could do nothing for them because he would “come in contact 
with the whole state of Missouri.”32 The “Mormon problem” per­
plexed the congressmen whom the Saints next petitioned. Although 
the Senate Judiciary Committee debated the Mormons’ petition for 
three days,33 the question of the Senate’s jurisdiction, and the political 
undesirability of siding with the Mormons, resulted in an unfavorable 
disposition by the committee.
The disheartening Missouri episode led the Mormons to con­
clude that the political branches of the federal government, as well as 
the branches of Missouri state government, were incapable, incompe­
tent, or at least disinclined to offer either protection or redress. As a 
result, the Mormons turned inward, forging a new society in Nauvoo, 
Illinois, that combined democratic and theocratic elements of govern-
27. The order of extermination directed the state militia to treat the Mormons as enemies 
who “must be exterminated or driven from the state/’ 3 J. Smith, supra note 12, at 175.
28. Id. at 183-86, 212.
29. Id. at 192.
30. Id. at 311.
31. See 4 J. Smith, supra note 12, at 24-38.
32. Id. at 40, 5:393, 6:203.
33. See 57 Niles Nat’l Register 398 (1840) (LDS Church Archives); Cong. G lobe, Feb.
12, at 185 (1840).
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ment to provide for substantial autonomy, insularity, and self­
sufficiency.
With Nauvoo’s government in place, Joseph Smith and the 
Nauvoo city council attempted to insulate themselves from what the 
Mormons saw as continuing harassment through vexatious lawsuits.34 
To accomplish these ends, the council passed numerous ordinances, 
which increasingly expanded the power of the city council. Eventu­
ally, these ordinances gave the council a virtual carte blanche to de­
clare any writ issued by any other court valid or invalid and, if 
necessary, examine the merits of the case.35
The greatest abuse of the council’s power, however, occurred 
with the destruction of the Nauvoo Expositor. During the Spring of 
1844, a group of influential Nauvoo citizens became disaffected with 
the Church and particularly its prophet.36 Alarmed that Joseph 
Smith had cloaked himself with both religious and temporal power, 
the group published a newspaper on June 7, 1844, containing bristling 
editorials about the integrity and morality of Nauvoo’s leaders.37 The 
Nauvoo City Council met the following day and passed an ordinance 
declaring the paper a public nuisance and ordering its destruction.38 
The destruction of the Nauvoo Expositor was more than the citizens 
could bear. The threat of the “Mormon Kingdom” under the cover 
of the Nauvoo Charter led to the murders of Joseph and Hyrum 
Smith before the month was out, and ultimately to the Mormon mi­
gration to the Great Basin.
II. The Judicial Campaign Against Polygamy
The Mormons moved to the Great Basin desert to find the auton­
omy that would allow them to build Zion unimpeded by religious per­
secution. The choice of a largely uninhabited desert as the center 
place for the kingdom was primarily motivated by the Saints’ desire to 
be left alone so they could freely establish a distinctive way of life that 
other communities had found so threatening and offensive. Instead, 
they now had to deal with the federal government, initially cautious 
but soon hostile and bent on eradicating Mormon distinctiveness.
34. See Kimball, A Wall to Defend Zion: The Nauvoo Charter, 15 BYU Stud. 491 (1975).
35. See 5 J. Smith, supra note 12, at 185-92; Oaks, The Suppression o f the Nauvoo Exposi­
tor, 9 U ta h  L. Rev. 862, 888 (1965).
36. See 6 J. Smith, supra note 12, at 344-51, 405, 412-13.
37. See L. N e w e ll & V. A very, M ormon Enigma: Emma H a le  Smith (1985).
38. See 6 J. Smith, supra note 12, at 448.
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A. Early Judicial Attacks on Polygamy
Officially acknowledged as part of LDS Church doctrine in 1852, 
polygamy soon became a national issue. Congress’ first attempt to 
deal with polygamy was the Morrill Act.39 It was not passed until 
1862, ten years after the Church first announced its practice of polyg­
amy, and then it largely went unenforced for the next thirteen years.
Because of various defects in the statute, however, the first at­
tempts to prosecute polygamists were not brought under the Morrill 
Act at all. In 1871, Thomas Hawkins was indicted for and convicted 
of having adulterous relations with his polygamous wife.40 Indict­
ments immediately followed against a number of leading Church offi­
cials (including Brigham Young) under a Utah statute prohibiting 
lewd and lascivious cohabitation.41 By indicting the Church’s leading 
figures, the government sought to set a vivid example for rank and file 
members, paralyze the Church’s leadership, and cow the Mormon 
populace into submission to federal policy.
The government’s plan, however, was not to be realized. In Clin­
ton v. Englebrecht,42 the United States Supreme Court ruled that in 
his efforts to purge juries of Mormons and secure the conviction of 
polygamists, Judge McKean, a rabid anti-Mormon, had improperly 
ignored Utah’s jury selection procedures. As a result, Hawkins’ con­
viction for adultery was overturned, and the indictments against 
Young and the others were dismissed.43 The prosecution of polygamy 
thus was halted until 1875 and the Reynolds case. Even after the 
Reynolds decision upheld the Morrill Act, that statute remained “con­
stitutionally pure, but practically worthless,”44 and only two Morrill 
Act cases ever reached the Supreme Court.45
B. The Reynolds Decision
George Reynolds was an English immigrant, private secretary to
39. Morrill Act, ch. 126, 1-03, 12 Stat. 501-02 (1862).
40. See Linford, The Mormons and the Law: The Polygamy Cases, 9 U ta h  L. Rev. 308, 
330 (1964).
41. See 5 B. R oberts, Com prehensive H isto ry  o f th e  C h u rch  o f Jesus C h ris t o f 
L a t te r -d a y  S ain ts 395 (1930).
42. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 434 (1871).
43. See Linford, supra note 40, at 331.
44. See Davis, The Polygamous Prelude, 7 Am. J. L eg a l Hist. 1, 9-10 (1962).
45. Miles v. United States 103 U.S. 304 (1880); Reynolds v. United States, 198 U.S. 145 
(1878).
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Brigham Young, and a polygamist.46 In October 1874, he was in­
dicted under the Morrill Act,47 and subsequently convicted of polyg­
amy on the testimony of his polygamous wife. On appeal to the Utah 
Supreme Court, Reynolds argued that the grand jury that had in­
dicted him had been improperly constituted.48 The Utah Supreme 
Court agreed and reversed Reynolds’ conviction because the trial 
court had followed federal rather than territorial law in fixing the size 
of the grand jury.
In October 1875 Reynolds was indicted again for violating the 
Morrill Act. This time, in accordance with Utah law, the indictment 
was handed down by a grand jury of fifteen men, seven Mormons and 
eight non-Mormons.49 Again, Reynolds was convicted and sentenced 
to two years’ hard labor and a $500 fine. The Utah Supreme Court 
sustained his conviction.50
With but one avenue of appeal remaining, Reynolds turned to 
the United States Supreme Court,51 which affirmed the territorial 
court’s rejection of Reynolds’ challenges to the grand jury’s size, im­
proprieties in jury selection and prejudicial jury instruction. But the 
bulk of the Court’s opinion was devoted to Reynolds’ claim that the 
trial court improperly failed to instruct the jury that a finding that 
Reynolds engaged in polygamy as a result of a sincere religious con­
viction would justify his acquittal. Reynolds argued that the first 
amendment’s guarantee of the free exercise of religion can excuse con­
duct that would otherwise be criminal. The Court’s analysis of that 
issue made Reynolds a landmark case.
The Reynolds Court first attempted to define how the word reli­
gion fell within the ambit of the free exercise clause.52 Finding no 
guide to the definition of the term religion in the Constitution itself, 
the Court turned to the writings of Madison and Jefferson, sources 
contemporary with the adoption of the first amendment. The Court 
quoted from Jefferson to the effect that “religion is a matter which lies 
solely between man and his God; . . . the legislative powers of the
46. See Davis, Plural Marriage and Religious Freedom: The Impact o f Reynolds v. United 
States, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 287, 287-88 (1973).
47. See 5 B. R oberts, supra note 41, at 469.
48. United States v. Reynolds, 1 Utah 226 (1875).
49. See Linford, supra note 40, at 333.
50. United States v. Reynolds, 1 Utah 319 (1876), a ff’d , 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
51. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
52. U.S. Const, amend. I.
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government reach actions only, and not opinions.”53 Adopting this 
demarcation, the Court concluded that “Congress was deprived of all 
legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions 
which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good 
order.”54
In arriving at the conclusion that “laws are made for the govern­
ment of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious 
belief and opinions, they may with practices,”55 the Court grasped 
one-half of a profound dilemma posed by the first amendment’s pro­
tection of religion. The Court recognized that the first amendment 
could not be read so broadly that any conduct asserted to be an exer­
cise of religion would be immune from state regulation.56 But the 
Court wrongly concluded that, because not all religious conduct rea­
sonably could be exempted from civil control, no religious conduct 
was protected by the first amendment. By so concluding, the Court 
ignored the express terms of the Constitution, which protect the “free 
exercise” of religion.57 Moreover, the Court overlooked the other side 
of the first amendment dilemma. Religion is as much conduct as it is 
belief. The two cannot be disentangled. It is the religious practice of 
unpopular minorities that are most likely to be restricted by the state 
and thus are most in need of protection. The free speech clause of the 
first amendment fully protects the freedom of belief. Thus, unless the 
free exercise clause protects at least some practices that are offensive 
to the majority, that provision is devoid of any practical content. Yet, 
the Reynolds decision forecloses such an application of the first 
amendment.
Having established the belief-conduct distinction and determined 
that the first amendment was no bar to outlawing religiously inspired 
conduct, the Court next concluded that polygamy was sufficiently 
“subversive of good order” as to be made a crime properly. This sec-
53. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878); see also T. J e f fe rso n , T he  Com­
p le t e  J e f fe r s o n  518-19 (S. Padover ed. 1943).
54. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
55. Id. at 166.
56. “To permit this,” the Court reasoned, “would be to make the professed doctrines of 
religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a 
law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances.” Id. at 
167. To illustrate this point, the Court produced a parade of horrors, examples of religiously 
inspired conduct that no civilized society could abide, such as human sacrifice.
57. In the face of this language, the Court’s attempt to define constitutionally protected 
religion as belief, as one constitutional scholar concludes, “is peculiar.” See L. T ribe , A m eri­
c a n  C o n s t i tu t io n a l  L aw  838 n. 1 (1978); see also Freeman, A Remonstrance for Conscience,
106 U. Pa. L. R ev. 802, 826 (1958).
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ond conclusion is also troublesome. As Linford notes, “[T]he Court 
never quite explained why plural marriage was a threat to the public 
well-being.”58 Laurence Tribe suggests that Reynolds was wrongly 
decided because the Court overrode core personal rights of privacy 
and religious expression for the sake of diffuse social goals.59 No vic­
tim of Reynolds’ conduct was produced, it was conceded that polyga­
mous sects might be well-ordered, and the Court never examined 
whether polygamy degraded women. Instead, the Court found sub­
version of the social order on the basis of an abstract syllogism that 
polygamy meant patriarchy, which meant despotism. To avoid this 
amorphous social evil, the Court invaded the right to marry, a core 
element of personhood. Nevertheless, Reynolds’ conviction was 
unanimously affirmed.60
C. The Prosecution of Cohabitation Under the Edmunds Act
Although the Reynolds decision was a saddening blow to the 
Mormons, the immediate impact of the decision was limited. Reyn­
olds established that Congress had the power to punish polygamy, but 
the Morrill Act was a cumbersome weapon with which to do so. 
However, the period in which the Mormons would effectively resist 
Washington’s mandate was rapidly ending. By 1880, the tone of con­
gressional debate indicated that the government not only had the 
power to outlaw polygamy but also had the will to act.
In 1882 Congress adopted the Edmunds Act, which gave federal 
officials an efficient weapon for the prosecution of polygamists.61 It 
created the new offense of unlawful cohabitation (relieving prosecu­
tors of the burden of proving polygamous marriages), allowed joinder 
of polygamy and cohabitation charges, and effectively eliminated all 
Mormons as jurors in polygamy cases. The new law proved an effec­
tive tool in the hands of the Church’s opponents. By 1893, after the 
Church had renounced polygamy and prosecutions largely ceased, 
there had been 1004 convictions for unlawful cohabitation and thirty-
58. See Linford, supra note 40, at 341.
59. See L. T ribe , supra note 57, at 838, n.15.
60. On a petition for rehearing, it was pointed out that Reynolds’ sentence to hard labor 
had been improper because the statute provided only for imprisonment. The Court, therefore, 
reversed the lower court’s judgment in this respect and remanded the case so that the district 
court could impose proper punishment. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 168-89. Reynolds was resen­
tenced to two years in prison and was released five months early for good behavior. He was 
received as a ‘living martyr” and ultimately became a General Authority of the Church. See 
Davis, supra note 46, at 291, 291 n.24.
61. Edmunds Act, ch. 47, 1-9, 22 Stat. 30-32 (1882).
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one for polygamy.62 The number of polygamy and cohabitation con­
victions, however, understates the impact of “the raid” on Mormon 
society. Not just any Mormon male was allowed to practice polyg­
amy; only those who were morally worthy and financially able were 
permitted to take plural wives. Thus, by and large, the polygamists 
were also the Mormons’ leaders.63 The conviction and imprisonment 
of polygamists served to paralyze Mormon society by removing its 
leadership.
To simplify polygamy prosecution, the Edmunds Act provided 
that men who “cohabit with more than one woman” would be guilty 
of a misdemeanor.64 The Act, however, did not say that conduct con­
stituted cohabitation, nor does the Congressional Record offer any evi­
dence that Congress considered the question. The Mormons argued 
that the benchmark of “cohabitation” should be sexual intercourse. 
The courts first confronted the issue of what constituted cohabitation 
in United States v. Cannon.65 Angus Cannon, president of the Salt 
Lake Stake, had married three wives prior to passage of the Edmunds 
Act.66 Two of these wives, Clara and Amanda, lived with him in sep­
arate quarters in the same home. The third lived in a house nearby.67 
Cannon was indicted for cohabiting with Amanda and Clara after 
passage of the Edmunds Act. At trial, Cannon offered to prove that, 
after Congress had passed the Edmunds Act, he had told Clara, 
Amanda, and their families that he did not intend to violate the law 
and thereafter “did not occupy the rooms or bed of, or have any sex­
ual intercourse with” Clara but he could not afford to provide a sepa­
rate house for Clara and her family. The court excluded the evidence 
as irrelevant, and Cannon was convicted.
Cannon appealed to the Utah Supreme Court.68 His main objec­
tions were that “all cohabitation which the laws deals with is sexual 
cohabitation,” of which he was innocent, and that his proffered evi­
dence was wrongly excluded. The court, however, rejected this inter­
62. See L. A r r in g to n ,  G r e a t  B asin K ingdom : A n Econom ic H is to ry  o f  t h e  L a t ­
t e r - d a y  S a in ts  359 (1958).
63. During this period, no General Authority and few bishops, stake presidents, or their 
counselors were monogamists. See L. A rr in g to n  & D. B itto n , The M ormon Experi­
ence 204 (1979).
64. Edmunds Act, section 3, 22 Stat. 30,31 (1882).
65. 4 Utah 122, 76 P. 369 (Utah), a ff’d, 116 U.S. 55 (1885), vacated, 118 U.S. 355 (1886).
66. See Linford, supra note 40, at 351.
67. See Cannon, 116 U.S. at 60-61, 65.
68. In May 1885 instructions came from the underground headquarters of the Church to 
defend every case “with all zeal and energy possible.” See G. L arso n , T h e  A m e ric a n iz a ­
t io n  o f  U ta h  f o r  S ta te h o o d  133-34 (1971).
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pretation of the Edmunds Act. It concluded that “cohabitation” 
meant dwelling together and not sexual intercourse.69 The United 
States Supreme Court affirmed the decision.70 Adopting much of the 
reasoning of the Utah court, the Supreme Court concluded that co­
habitation was established if Cannon “held [the two women] out to 
the world, by his language or conduct, or both, as his wives.” Can­
non’s agreement to abstain from sexual relations with his plural wives 
was dismissed with the comment that “compacts for sexual non-inter­
course, easily made and easily broken, when the prior marriage rela­
tions continue to exist . . . [are] not a lawful substitute for the 
monogamous family which alone the statute tolerates.”71 Conse­
quently, proving cohabitation became ridiculously easy for federal 
prosecutors. As one scholar concluded, “To be tried was, in effect, to 
be convicted.”72
As the pace of polygamy prosecutions accelerated, the thought 
occurred to some eager prosecutor that the cohabitation statute would 
be more fearsome if every defendant faced not one cohabitation 
charge but many. Such would be the case if each year, month, or day 
that a man cohabited illegally could be the basis of a separate offense. 
A judicial test of this theory was attempted in the case of Lorenzo 
Snow. Snow was charged with cohabitation in three separate indict­
ments, each one charging the same offense with the same women, only 
for different years. In separate trials, Snow was convicted on each 
indictment and given the maximum sentence for each conviction. 
Thus, by segregating the charges against Snow, the prosecution was 
able to triple his punishment. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the 
convictions.73 The United States Supreme Court dismissed Snow’s 
appeal on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction to hear it, be­
cause Snow did not question the validity of the statute but only its 
application.74
69. A companion case to Cannon reaffirmed that evidence of sexual conduct was irrele­
vant. See United States v. Musser, 4 Utah 153, 7 P. 389 (1885). Musser was a stronger case for 
a finding of no cohabitation because the defendant had established each of his plural wives in a 
separate house. In sustaining Musser’s conviction, the Utah court noted that one of Congress’ 
purposes in passing the Edmunds Act was to reach prominent Church leaders who had es­
caped prosecution under the Morrill Act’s three-year statute of limitations. Id. at 157-58, 7 P. 
at 391.
70. 116 U.S. 74 (1885), vacated, 118 U.S. 355 (1886).
71. Id. at 71-72. Justices Field and Miller dissented, arguing that the prohibition of co­
habitation should be interpreted to mean “unlawful habitual sexual intercourse.” The dissent 
termed the majority’s holding “a strained construction of a highly penal statute.” Id. at 79-80.
72. Linford, supra note 40, at 348.
73. 4 Utah 280, 295, 313, 9 P. 501, 686, 697, appeals dismissed, 118 U.S. 346 (1886).
74. Snow v. United States, 118 U.S. 346 (1886). Realizing that it had already decided one
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With the principle of segregation having been approved by the 
Utah Supreme Court and the possibility of further review seemingly 
precluded by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Snow, 
federal prosecutors swiftly began expanding their use of the segrega­
tion of offenses, testing how far the principle could be pushed. In 
United States v. Groesbeck,15 the prosecution cut in half the period of 
each offense, charging the defendant with two counts of cohabitation, 
one for each of two six-month periods. Unlike the Snow case, the trial 
of the two charges was consolidated. On appeal, the Utah Supreme 
Court sustained both of these innovations.76 The court dismissed the 
argument that a single trial of the defendant on both charges allowed 
the jury improperly to consider Groesbeck’s first conviction in deter­
mining his guilt on the second charge. The court noted that consoli­
dation of offenses into a single trial saved the state the burden and 
expenses, and the defendant the harassment, of multiple litigation.
Meanwhile, Lorenzo Snow had served his first six-month sen­
tence. He then applied to the United States Supreme Court for a writ 
of habeas corpus, claiming that his further detention was unlawful 
because the two remaining sentences were the result of an unlawful 
segregation of a single offense. As before, the government contended 
that the Court lacked jurisdiction, but this time the Court held that it 
had jurisdiction.77 Cohabitation, the Court stated, was “inherently a 
continuous offense, having duration; and not an offense consisting of 
an isolated act.”78
Even after In re Snow, the courts could still impose multiple pun­
ishments for what was in reality but one offense. The Edmunds Act 
specifically allowed polygamy and cohabitation charges to be com­
bined.79 Because the definitions of the offenses were different, a man 
could be convicted of marrying a polygamous wife and then convicted 
again for living with her.80 The Supreme Court set limits on the com-
other cohabitation case, Cannon v. United States, 116 U.S. 55 (1885), the Court vacated its 
decision in that case as having been issued without jurisdiction. See Snow, 118 U.S. at 355. 
Other courts continued to cite Cannon as an authoritative interpretation of the Edmunds Act, 
even though it no longer was binding precedent. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 6 Utah 120,
125, 21 P. 463 (1889); United States v. Kuntz, 2 Idaho 446, 21 P. 407 (1889); United States v. 
Peay, 5 Utah 263, 14 P. 342, 345 (1887).
75. 4 Utah 487, 11 P. 542 (1886).
76. Id.
77. In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 285 (1887).
78. Id. at 281.
79. See Edmunds Act, section 4, 22 Stat. 30, 31 (1882).
80. For example, in Clawson v. United States, 113 U.S. 143 (1885), the defendant was 
convicted of polygamy for marrying a second wife and sentenced to three-and-one-half years’
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bination of different offenses in Hans Nielsen.81 Nielsen was indicted 
for adultery and cohabitation. Both charges were directed at his con­
duct with his polygamous wife, Caroline. Nielsen pleaded guilty to 
the charge of cohabitation and was sentenced to three months’ impris­
onment. When arraigned on the adultery charge, Nielsen claimed his 
conviction for cohabitation barred his further prosecution. After 
serving his sentence for cohabitation, Nielsen was tried and convicted 
for adultery and sentenced to an additional 125 days’ imprisonment. 
The United States Supreme Court granted Nielsen’s petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus.
The Court managed to arrive at a sensible result. It reasoned 
that proof that Nielsen and Caroline live together as husband and 
wife carried with it the assumption of intercourse that was the essen­
tial element of the adultery charge. Thus, when Nielsen was con­
victed of cohabitation, he was convicted of all the elements of adultery 
and could not be convicted separately for that offense. With Hans 
Nielsen, attempts to make the polygamy laws more savage by piling 
offenses together or fracturing a single act into many separate offenses 
ceased.
The Edmunds Act prosecutions also saw a distortion of the rules 
of evidence, in part due to the same vindictive spirit that animated the 
harsh application of the polygamy laws, but in part the result of that 
same vagueness and emphasis on appearance that afflicted the sub­
stantive provisions of the Edmunds Act. Because the offense of co­
habitation consisted of appearing to consort with two or more 
women, as long as a man cohabited with only one woman, he would 
seem to be in compliance with the law, regardless of whether that 
woman was the man’s lawful wife. Thus, a polygamist seemingly 
could abandon his legally recognized wife, live exclusively with a later 
plural wife, and not be guilty of cohabitation.82 The judicial solution 
to this problem was a presumption, first announced in United States v. 
Snow, that a man cohabited with his legal wife.83
imprisonment and a $500 fine. He was also convicted of cohabiting with that wife and sen­
tenced to six months and a $300 fine.
81. 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
82. A construction of the Edmunds Act that allowed a polygamist to retain whichever 
one of his wives he wished to long as he retained only one, however, was not well received by 
the courts. The Utah Supreme Court suggested that if the act were to have that effect it should 
have been entitled “An Act to enable a man to forsake his lawful wife, and fly to the arms of 
his concubine.” United States v. Snow, 4 Utah 313, 9 P. 697-701, appeal dismissed, 118 U.S. 
346 (1886).
83. United States v. Snow, 4 Utah 280, 9 P. 501, 504, appeal dismissed, 118 U.S. 346 
(1886).
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To comply with the law, Lorenzo Snow had set each of his older 
wives up in a separate household and refrained from almost all con­
tact with them. He lived solely with his last wife, who still had infant 
children to raise. Nevertheless, he was convicted of cohabitation. 
The Utah Supreme Court upheld the conviction, not because he was 
cohabiting with more than one wife, but because he was with the 
wrong wife. The court reasoned that the Edmunds Act, like prior 
acts, was intended to protect the institution of monogamous marriage 
and should be construed liberally to achieve that intent. Thus, the 
court presumed that a man cohabited with his lawful wife. At first 
this was offered as a rebuttable presumption, justified by society’s pol­
icy of encouraging marital fidelity and by common experience as a 
factual generalization. The Snow court still appeared to require at 
least some evidence of actual cohabitation. Clever polygamists were 
able to get around the presumption by demonstrating that, in their 
case, it was incorrect. Thus, courts very quickly deemphasized the 
factual rationale for the presumption and instead emphasized its legal 
and social policy rationale. As they did, the strength of the presump­
tion increased, and the extent to which it could be refuted by contrary 
evidence diminished.84
Finally, in 1888 the Utah Supreme Court so diluted the amount 
of evidence required to render the presumption of cohabitation with a 
legal wife conclusive that, in effect, the presumption became a conclu­
sive presumption of law. In United States v. Harris,*5 the court ap­
proved jury instructions to the effect that if “the legal wife of the 
defendant lives in the same vicinity with him, bearing his name, in a 
household maintained in part by him; that is . . . absolutely and con­
clusively cohabitation with his legal wife.”86 Under such a standard, 
it seemed unlikely that any polygamist could insulate himself from all 
contact with his lawful wife sufficiently to avoid a finding of cohabita­
tion. In effect, then, the offenses of polygamy and cohabitation be­
came identical in terms of the proof required for each: each could be 
proven by evidence that a couple associated so as to appear to be mar­
ried. Statements by a defendant that a woman was his wife, made out 
of court and before any charges had been made against him, could be 
introduced at trial to prove his marriage,87 or to prove cohabitation.88
84. See, e.g., United States v. Snow, 4 Utah 295, 9 P. 686, 688, appeal dismissed, 118 U.S. 
346 (1886); United States v. Clark, 5 Utah 226, 14 P. 288, 291 (1887).
85. 5 Utah 436, 17 P. 75 (1888).
86. Id.
87. United States v. Simpson, 4 Utah 227, 228, 7 P. 257, 258 (1885).
88. United States v. Schow, 6 Utah 381, 24 P. 30 (1890).
296 JOURNAL OF LAW  & RELIG IO N [Vol. 7
In loosening the rules of evidence to serve Congress’ policy of 
ensuring the punishment of polygamy, the courts undermined the ele­
mental bases of judicial procedure and due process of law. The most 
basic assumption that an accused is presumed innocent and must be 
found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by competent evidence was 
sapped of all strength. The courts were indeed accurate when they 
identified cohabitation as an offense of appearance or reputation, for 
under such evidentiary standards an accused’s actual conduct seemed 
largely irrelevant.
D. Witnesses to Cohabitation
To convict Mormon men of polygamy offenses, certainly no 
more effective and knowledgeable witnesses could be found than their 
wives. Two obstacles, however, appeared to bar use of this pool of 
witnesses. First, most Mormon wives were unwilling to testify against 
their husbands. Second, even if they were willing to testify, at com­
mon law a person could not testify against his or her spouse. These 
problems were first confronted in United States v. Miles,89 the only 
other Morrill Act case to reach the United States Supreme Court be­
sides Reynolds.
From the evidence at trial, it appeared that John Miles had mar­
ried three women on the same day. Because Miles was charged with 
bigamy, under the Morrill Act, it was necessary to prove his mar­
riages to the three women. Therein lay the difficulty, for the marriage 
ceremony was shrouded in secrecy. Miles’ wife, Caroline, however, 
was willing to testify against him. Miles conceded his marriage to 
Caroline but denied his marriage to his first wife. Caroline’s testi­
mony was essential to the state’s case; but if Caroline was Miles’ law­
ful wife, under the common law rule her testimony was inadmissible. 
But her testimony helped establish that at the time Miles married her 
he already had a lawful wife. And if Miles had a wife when he mar­
ried Caroline, his marriage to her was invalid, and she was a compe­
tent witness. The trial court resolved this perplexing question by 
throwing the whole matter to the jury. Caroline was allowed to 
testify.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court rejected the trial 
court’s ingenious labor-saving device. It concluded that a defendant’s 
witness-wife must be treated prima facie as his lawful wife.90 The
89. 103 U.S. 304 0881), rev’d, 2 Utah 19 (1887).
90. Id. at 315.
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principle behind this ruling was the old rule that a witness that is 
“prima facie incompetent” cannot give evidence “to establish his 
competency, and at the same time prove the issue.”91 The Court 
reached this ruling with apparent regret, for in doing so it recognized 
that it was disabling almost all witnesses to polygamous unions. 
However, the Court recommended two escapes from this predica­
ment. First, eyewitnesses to a marriage were not necessary. Polyga­
mous marriages could be proven like any other fact, by admissions of 
the defendant or by circumstantial evidence.92 Second, if under ex­
isting laws it was too difficult to prove polygamy, Congress could al­
ways change the law. Because it was based on the testimony of an 
incompetent witness, Miles’ conviction was reversed.93
Miles did not end the issue of a wife’s competency to testify 
against her husband. The general rule that a wife was not a compe­
tent witness against her husband was subject, under common law and 
the Utah statute, to several exceptions. A Utah statute, for example, 
provided that a wife could testify against her husband in a criminal 
action for a crime committed by one against the other.94 In United 
States v. Bassett95, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that polyg­
amy, in fact, was an offense by the husband against his lawful wife. 
Thus, the rule of spousal disability did not apply, and the wife was a 
competent witness.96 Again, however, the United States Supreme 
Court rejected the territorial court’s analysis.97 First, the Court con­
cluded that the Utah courts had applied the wrong statute. Less tech­
nically, the Court concluded that even under the statute employed by 
the Utah courts, polygamy could not be properly viewed as an offense 
against the wife.98
Nearly seven years after the United States Supreme Court deci­
sion in Miles excluded the testimony of polygamous wives in polyg­
amy trials, in the Edmunds-Tucker Act, Congress provided that a 
wife was a competent witness in polygamy, bigamy, and cohabitation 
trials and required that records be kept of weddings in the territo-
91. Id. at 314.
92. Id. at 311.
93. Id. at 315-16.
94. United States v. Bassett, 5 Utah 131, 13 P. 237, 240 (1887), rev’d, 137 U.S. 496 (1890).
95. 5 Utah 131, 13 p. 237 (1887), rev’d, 137 U.S. 496 (1890).
96. For other early efforts by the Utah Supreme Court to deal with the problem of polyga­
mous wives’ testimony, see United States v. Kershaw, 5 Utah 618, 19 P. 194 (1888); United 
States v. Cutler, 5 Utah 608, 19 P. 145 (1988); United States v. White, 4 Utah 499, 11 P. 570 
(1886).
97. See Bassett, 137 U.S. 496 (1890).
98. Id. at 506.
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lies." These provisions still retained one restraint on spousal testi­
mony, however; they provided only that a willing wife would be 
allowed to testify. Utah’s judges did not always follow the law, how­
ever. A number of Mormon women were required to testify against 
their husbands or face contempt charges. Judicial use of the contempt 
power in the polygamy cases thus presented many Mormon families 
with a cruel dilemma. If the wife called as a witness submitted and 
testified, her husband would almost surely be convicted and impris­
oned. If she refused, her husband might escape conviction, but the 
wife would be imprisoned. Perhaps the most egregious case of judi­
cial conduct in this regard was that of Belle Harris. Mrs. Harris and 
her infant son ultimately spent three and one-half months in prison 
for her refusal to testify before a grand jury investigating polygamy 
charges against her husband.100
In retrospect, it is difficult to offer any explanation for this judi­
cial conduct toward Mormon wives other than a spirit of vindictive­
ness. Courts had reduced the quantum of evidence required to 
establish polygamy or cohabitation to such a low level that in almost 
any case, ample alternate sources of proof must have been available. 
Utah’s courts could not have believed that they needed to compel 
Mormon women to testify in order to convict their polygamous 
husbands.
E. The Vitality of Reynolds Today
The legislative and judicial war on polygamy was ultimately suc­
cessful. The Church officially abandoned the practice in 1890. The 
war, however, was not without its casualties. The Court’s decision in 
Reynolds was a good example of “a situation where the social import 
of the issue outstrips the political and legal resources of the time.”101 
The Court’s overly restrictive view of the free exercise clause virtually 
read it out of the Constitution for over sixty years. [For discussions of 
the present state of the law, see Pepper and Marshall, this issue.]
The belief-conduct distinction of Reynolds has been largely jet­
tisoned by later cases. Substantial protection of religious practice as 
well as belief is now accepted under the free exercise clause. Because 
belief has long been protected under the speech clause, this develop­
ment is logical, historically correct, and beneficial to society. Never-
99. See sections 1, 9, 24 Stat. 635, 636 (1887).
100. See In re Harris, 4 Utah 5, 5 P. 129 (1884).
101. Keller, Book Review, 85 H a rv . L. R ev. 1082, 1086 (1972) (referring to a different 
issue—municipal railroad bonding).
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theless, it would be unrealistic to expect a Supreme Court as socially 
conservative as this, or for that matter, any Court likely to exist in the 
near future, to overturn Reynolds formally and sanction the practice 
of polygamy.102 Nor, for that matter would it be likely that the Mor­
mon Church would enter into that practice ever again, even if the law 
permitted it. What might have been expected, however, is that the 
emergence of the free exercise clause as a vibrant base for civil liberta­
rian protection of rights of conscience under Sherbert and Yoder 
would be strengthened and expanded.
III. The War Against Mormon Society
Public debate on the “Mormon issue” and the legal conflict be­
tween the Mormons and the federal government largely centered on 
the issue of polygamy. But there were other points of conflict between 
the Mormons and the rest of the nation. Most aspects of Mormon life 
that made the Mormons distinctive came under attack by the federal 
government. For the more farsighted critics, the Church’s economic, 
social, and political power were more significant than the issue of po­
lygamy, and the curtailment of the Church’s political and economic 
activities by the federal government may have had a more enduring 
impact on Mormonism than the prohibition of polygamy.
A. Civil Rights Violations: The Assault on Mormon Political
Power
During the period of conflict between the Mormons and the fed­
eral government, Congress never directly passed a law depriving 
Mormons of their civil rights simply because they were Mormons, 
even though, as applied by hostile federal judges and officials, some 
laws came close to that result. Nevertheless, throughout the polyg­
amy prosecutions, federal attempts to simplify and expedite the con­
viction of polygamists routinely denied Mormons many of their 
fundamental rights. Done under the guise of stamping out polygamy, 
the Mormons’ civil rights were abridged in five significant and specific 
respects: Mormons were denied the right to serve as jurors; Mormons 
were denied the right to hold elective and public offices; Mormons 
were denied their franchise; children of polygamous marriages were 
denied inheritance rights; and the immigration of Mormons into the 
United States was obstructed and foreign-bom Mormons were denied 
citizenship.
102. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 247 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
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1. The Exclusion of Mormons as Jurors
In response to repeated calls by President Rutherford B. Hayes 
to withdraw the privileges of citizenship from Mormons in Utah,103 
Congress passed the Edmunds Act in 1882. The act broadly provided 
that past or present polygamists and those who believed in polygamy 
could be excluded from jury duty. Potential jurors could further be 
questioned under oath regarding their polygamous activities or beliefs 
and could be rejected for failing to answer such questions.104 Sup­
porters of the Act claimed, of course, that the measure was necessary 
to ensure the effective prosecution of polygamists.105 As disabling as 
the law was, however, the Edmunds Act only ratified a position al­
ready adopted by the United States Supreme Court two years earlier, 
in Miles v. United States.106
Convicted of polygamy under the Morrill Act, Miles argued on 
appeal that a large number of potential jurors had been improperly 
excluded because they had testified that they believed in polygamy. 
Miles argued that the examination of the proposed jurors showed that 
the court, in effect, had administered an unlawful religious test to ex­
clude all Mormons from the jury. In upholding the Utah court, how­
ever, the Supreme Court relied on an 1878 territorial statute that 
provided that a juror could be disqualified for partiality.107 Although 
the Supreme Court upheld the procedure based on the Utah statute, it 
also noted that it would have reached the same result even without 
the statute because, under common law, a juror could be excluded for 
actual bias.108
Because the Supreme Court had upheld the exclusion of Mor­
mon jurors on the basis of Utah statute and common law principles, 
the provision of the Edmunds Act excluding Mormon jurors was pre­
dictably sustained in Clawson v. United States.109 Clawson was in­
dicted for cohabitation and polygamy by a grand jury from which 
Mormons had been systematically excluded. Although the Edmunds 
Act effectively excluded Mormons as “jurors” in polygamy cases,
103. See 7 J. R ich a rd so n , A C o m p ila tio n  o f  t h e  M essages a n d  P ap e rs  o f  t h e  
P re s id e n ts , 1789-1897 559 (1896-1899).
104. See section 5, 22 Stat. 31 (1882).
105. See 7 J. R ich a rd so n , supra note 103, at 606; R. D w y er, T he  G e n t i l e  Comes t o  
U ta h : A S tu d y  in  R e lig io u s  a n d  S o c ia l C o n f l i c t  42-43 (1971).
106. 103 U.S. 304 (1880).
107. Id. at 305.
108. Id. at 310.
109. 114 U.S. 477 (1885).
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Clawson argued that this exclusion did not extend to grand juries.110 
The Supreme Court, however, without considering the unique role of 
the grand jury in society, held that the term juror encompassed both 
grand and petit juries and that the Edmunds Act therefore must be 
read broadly to disable Mormons from service on any juries.111
In theory, Mormons were thus prohibited from serving as jurors 
only in polygamy trials. Idaho, a hotbed of anti-Mormon sentiment, 
carried Congress’ efforts a step further. An Idaho statute provided 
that only qualified electors could serve as jurors. Because Idaho law 
excluded Mormons from the vote, they were automatically barred 
from jury service as well. Even this draconian, blanket disability was 
upheld by the courts. In Territory v. Evans,112 the Idaho Supreme 
Court conceded that the law, in some counties, would exclude so 
many citizens that juries could not be selected but still upheld the 
exclusion of Mormons.113
2. The Exclusion of Mormons as Voters
While the Edmunds Act excluding the Mormons from polygamy 
trial juries was rationally related to the federal government’s goal of 
eliminating polygamy, other “anti-polygamy” measures of that Act 
were directly aimed at Mormon political power. One provision de­
nied polygamists the right to vote.114 To enforce this provision, 
Utah’s registration and election offices were declared vacant, and a 
five-man commission was appointed to oversee Utah elections.115 
During its first year the Utah Commission barred over 12,000 
Mormons from voting in Utah. This was nearly one-fourth of eligible 
Mormon voters, and far exceeded the number of polygamists in 
Utah.116
The Utah Commission’s exclusion of Mormon voters met an im­
mediate judicial challenge. In Murphy v. Ramsey,U1 the United States 
Supreme Court rebuked the Commission, but its decision had mixed 
results for the Mormons. The Court did hold that the powers of the 
Utah Commission were restricted to ensuring that elections in Utah 
were fairly and properly conducted, and that the Commission had no
110. Id. at 483-84.
111. Id.
112. 23 P. 232 (1890).
113. Id. at 233.
114. See section 8, 22 Stat. 31 (1882).
115. See section 9, 22 Stat. 32 (1882).
116. See J. A lle n  & G. L e o n a rd , T he S to ry  o f  t h e  L a t t e r - d a y  S a in ts  395 (1976).
117. 114 U.S. 15 (1884).
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further power to establish voter qualifications or to administer a 
voter’s oath. On the other hand, the Court held that because the 
Commission was legally powerless to exclude voters, it was not legally 
liable for the acts of voting officials who wrongfully obeyed the Com­
mission excluding the Mormons.118
On the substantive question of the scope of the Edmunds Act’s 
disenfranchisement of polygamists, the Murphy Court again ruled 
against the Mormons. Because the Act’s provisions extended to co­
habitants and polygamists without exclusion, it barred those who be­
came polygamists before the Act’s passage as well as those who did so 
after 1882.119 Nor was the statute an ex post facto law. The Act 
applied only to those who continued to practice polygamy and not to 
those who had abandoned that practice.120 The Court did not ques­
tion whether other constitutional provisions, such as the first amend­
ment, might impose some rational restrictions on Congress’ power to 
set voter qualifications.121
Following several decisions in Idaho122 and Nevada123 upholding 
further restrictions on the right of Mormons to vote, and following 
the United States Supreme Court’s use of an Idaho voting case as a 
soapbox for an extended diatribe on polygamy,124 Congress passed the 
Edmunds-Tucker Act in 1887, disenfranchising Mormon women and 
ending one of Utah’s most significant advances in civil rights.125 In 
1870, Utah’s territorial legislature had granted women the right to 
vote.126 Initially, Utah’s action won support even among the 
Mormons’ enemies, who believed Mormon women would swiftly use 
their new political power to end polygamy. The Mormons, con­
versely, may have granted women the vote to demonstrate that polyg­
amy and Mormon society in general did not oppress Mormon
118. Id. at 36-37.
119. Id. at 42.
120. Id. at 43.
121. Id  at 45.
122. Innis v. Bolton, 17 P. 264 (1888) (upheld an Idaho law excluding all Mormons from 
voting).
123. State v. Findley, 19 P. 241 (1888) (held invalid a law excluding all Mormons from 
voting, holding elective office, and serving on juries).
124. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (upheld the denial of the vote to an ex-Mormon 
in Idaho).
125. The Edmunds-Tucker Act provided “that it shall not be lawful for any female to vote 
at any election hereafter held in the Territory of Utah for any public purpose whatever, and no 
such vote shall be received or counted or given effect in any manner whatever.” Id. at section 
20, 24 Stat. 639 (1887).
126. Weisbrod & Sheingom, Reynolds v. United States: Nineteenth-Century Forms o f Mar­
riage and the Status o f Women, 10 Conn. L. Rev. 828, 828 n.3 (1978).
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women.127
Mormon women did not use their votes to end polygamy, so 
Mormonism’s critics reversed their position. Enfranchised Mormon 
women came to be seen as an impediment to the elimination of polyg­
amy and the destruction of the Mormons’ political power.
Given the judicial conclusion that the franchise in territories was 
a privilege that Congress could arbitrarily restrict, Congress’ disen­
franchisement of Utah’s women was legal. Its efficacy in hastening 
the end of polygamy, however, may be doubted.
3. The Exclusion of Mormons From Public Office
To the extent that Mormons were excluded from the vote, they 
were also and quite logically excluded from all elective and other pub­
lic offices. The Edmunds Act, in creating the Utah Commission to 
oversee Utah’s elections, mandated that no election could take place 
without the Commission’s supervision.128 Because the commission 
was unable to arrive in Utah in time, no election was possible in 
1882.129 So that elective offices would not stay vacant pending the 
next election, Congress hastily passed the Hoar Amendment allowing 
Utah’s governor to appoint officials to fill vacant elective offices until 
the next election.130
Some disagreement arose regarding the effect of the Hoar 
Amendment. The Mormons maintained that under Utah law, when 
an election was not held, incumbent officials simply retained their of­
fice. Thus, the governor had no appointments to make, for no offices 
were vacant. Utah’s governor, Eli H. Murray, a gentile who was hos­
tile to the Mormons and frustrated by their political obstructionism, 
decided that in spite of contrary Utah law, the offices were vacant. In 
September and October of 1882, he appointed a total of 174 replace­
ments to public office, almost all gentiles.131
Mormons reacted angrily to this attempted ouster, and many re­
fused to surrender their offices. Others instituted actions to validate 
their claim that no offices had been vacated due to the failure to hold 
elections when scheduled. In an unreported case, Kimball v. Rich­
ards,'12 the Utah Supreme Court held that the Hoar Amendment, in
127. Id. at 853-54 n.134, 852-53 n.130.
128. See section 8, 22 Stat. 31 (1887).
129. Wenner v. Smith, 9 P. 293 (Utah 1886).
130. See 22 Stat. 313 (1882).
131. See 5 B. R o b e rts , supra note 41, at 65-66.
132. See Wenner v. Smith, 9 P. 293, 297-98 (Utah 1886) (discussing Kimball v. Richards).
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fact, had vacated Utah’s elective offices, despite the amendment’s fail­
ure specifically to state this.
Despite this judicial setback, some Mormon officials still refused 
to relinquish their offices. The 1886 case of Wenner v. Smith133 illus­
trates this continuing resistance. Defendant Smith had been elected 
probate judge of Salt Lake County in 1880. By virtue of the Hoar 
Amendment, the governor considered Smith’s office to be vacant and 
appointed Uriah J. Wenner as his successor in September 1882 to 
serve for eight months. Smith, however, refused to turn over the of­
fice and continued to receive the fees and salary of the judgeship. 
Wenner sued to recover those sums.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that Wenner’s 
appointment was lawful. Moreover, because the Edmunds Act de­
clared polygamists unfit to hold public office and because Smith was a 
polygamist, the court concluded his judgeship had been vacated by 
the Edmunds Act without reference to the Hoar Amendment. Thus, 
Wenner had been wrongfully denied the office and was entitled to re­
cover the fees.
4. The Laws of Inheritance
Under common law, illegitimate children, if recognized by the 
law at all, could inherit property only from their mothers.134 Utah’s 
territorial legislature reversed this common law rule, and provided in 
1852 that “illegitimate children and their mothers inherit in like man­
ner from the father.”135 It is, of course, a rather fine question whether 
the children of polygamous Mormon marriages were illegitimate. 
Under common law and federal law after passage of the Morrill Act, 
polygamous marriages were unlawful, and the offspring of such un­
ions were presumably illegitimate. In Utah, when such marriages 
were recognized, the children were not illegitimate.
This state of affairs presented Congress with a problem. Clearly, 
it was the nation’s policy to forbid polygamy and crush institutions 
that supported and furthered the practice. Utah’s law allowing polyg­
amous wives and children to inherit in the same manner as monoga­
133. 9 P. 293 (Utah 1886).
134. See J. R itch ie , N. A l f o r d  & R. E f f la n d ,  C ases a n d  M a te r i a l s  on  D ece­
d e n ts ’ E s ta te s  a n d  T ru s ts  71-72 (5th ed. 1977).
135. 1876 Comp. Laws section 677, at 268. Utah’s present law, like that of many states, 
similarly provides that an illegitimate child may inherit from his father if he has been acknowl­
edged by his father, if the natural parents participated in a marriage ceremony before or after 
the birth, or if paternity has been otherwise satisfactorily established. See U ta h  C ode A nn. 
section 75-2-109(b) (1953).
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mous heirs arguably furthered the practice of polygamy. On the other 
hand, to overturn Utah’s laws and prohibit the children of polyga­
mous marriages from inheriting property was equally clearly a cruel 
punishment that would be levied primarily against innocent children. 
Sensibly, Congress simply left the' issue alone in 1887.
The continued Mormon resistance to enforcement of the polyg­
amy laws, however, finally eroded Congress’ moderate attitude to­
ward children of polygamy. In the Edmunds-Tucker Act, Congress 
annulled the Utah statute by providing that no illegitimate child shall 
be entitled to inherit from their father.136 As might be expected, the 
legislation spawned litigation. The question of the status of polyga­
mous children first came before the Utah Supreme Court in the case 
of Chapman v. Handley137 in 1890. George Handley died intestate in 
1874, leaving an estate of $25,000, a surviving widow, and eight chil­
dren, four of them the offspring of a then deceased plural wife. These 
polygamous children claimed an interest in Handley’s estate under 
the Utah statute allowing illegitimate children to inherit from their 
parents. Handley’s other children invoked the Morrill Act to block 
their claim. Their argument was that the Utah law violated public 
policy in general by supporting polygamy. More specifically, because 
Utah’s statute supported polygamy, the Morrill Act had expressly an­
nulled it.
The court expressed no doubt that the statute “was intended to, 
and did tend to, support, maintain, and countenance polygamy.”138 
Although the court recognized that its conclusion punished the inno­
cent children of polygamy, it noted that “Congress has recognized the 
potency of denying to illegitimate children the rights of legitimacy 
and inheritance as a means of breaking up and discouraging polygamy 
in the acts of 1882 and 1887.”139
In 1891, the year after the decision in Chapman v. Handley, an­
other case involving the same issues and similar facts was brought 
before the United States Supreme Court. In Cope v. Cope,140 however, 
the Supreme Court arrived at a different conclusion: “Legislation for 
the protection of children bom in polygamy is not necessarily legisla­
tion favorable to polygamy. There is no inconsistency in shielding the
136. See section 11, 24 Stat. 637 (1887).
137. 24 P. 673 (Utah 1890).
138. Id. at 675.
139. Id.
140. 137 U.S. 682 (1891).
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one and in denouncing the other as a crime.”141 Utah’s act, rather 
than promoting polygamy, simply protected the children of polyg­
amy.142 Further, Utah’s statute was not implicitly annulled by the 
Morrill Act in 1862. Rather, all of Congress’ acts relating to illegiti­
mate children should be read together, and “the later acts should also 
be regarded as legislative interpretations of the prior ones.”143 In 
1882 Congress had explicitly legitimated the children of polygamous 
marriages, and not until 1887 did it specifically bar their inheritance 
rights. These later actions demonstrated that in 1862 Congress had 
not meant to annul the Utah statute allowing illegitimate children to 
inherit.144
After 1890, when the Mormon Church formally renounced plu­
ral marriage, Utah again adopted a statute entitling the children of 
polygamous marriages to inherit property. The legislature further 
provided that any heir who had been previously denied an inheritance 
on the basis of his polygamous lineage could petition the courts for a 
redistribution of the estate.145 On the strength of this provision and in 
the wake of the favorable ruling in Cope, George Handley’s polyga­
mous children petitioned Utah’s courts to award them their rightful 
share of their father’s estate.
Apparently in a vengeful mood, Utah’s Supreme Court declined 
to redistribute the estate. Instead, the court struck down the statute. 
The court reasoned that the Utah Act reopened cases that had been 
resolved by the judiciary, thus second-guessing judicial judgment. 
Under the separation of powers, this interference with the judicial 
process was unconstitutional.146 Curiously, the court did not mention 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Cope v. Cope as a basis 
for its reconsideration of this case, even though that decision in effect 
overruled the territorial court’s decision in Handley.
The court’s action was a bitter but somewhat empty gesture. Be­
cause the Edmunds Act in 1882 legitimated polygamous children, the 
court’s ruling affected only the estates of those polygamists who had 
died prior to passage of the Edmunds Act.
141. Id. at 687.
142. Id. at 685.
143. Id. at 688.
144. Id. at 689.
145. See ch. 41, 1896 Utah Laws 128-29.
146. See In re Handley’s Estate, 48 P. 832 (Utah 1897).
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5. Immigration Laws
For the Mormons, Utah became the point from which they 
would carry the word of their gospel throughout the world and to 
which Mormon converts from around the world would gather. Spiri­
tually, immigration was the gathering of the Saints into the Mormon 
community. Economically, the immigrants brought the skills and 
hands needed to settle the wilderness.
With typical initiative, the Mormons organized the immigration 
of large numbers of converts through the Perpetual Emigrating Fund 
Company.147 This church-sponsored company provided agents to ar­
range the converts’ passage from Europe to the east coast of the 
United States, and from there to Utah. It also paid passage for those 
too poor to pay their own way. By 1870, the year after the transconti­
nental railroad was completed, the Perpetual Emigrating Fund Com­
pany had helped over 51,000 Mormon immigrants reach Utah.148
This large scale flow of new, foreign Mormons into Utah natu­
rally alarmed the Church’s enemies, who feared that the faith of the 
converts would revitalize the Church’s doctrines.149 The point was 
made more luridly by fictionalized reports that the Mormons im­
ported young, innocent girls to become polygamous wives in a sort of 
religious slavery.150 President Ulysses S. Grant reflected on this view 
when he recommended to Congress in his annual message on Decem­
ber 7, 1875 that it “drive out licensed immorality, such as polygamy 
and the importation of women for illegitimate purposes.”151
A decade later, in 1885, President Grover Cleveland recom­
mended to Congress that it prevent the immigration of Mormons into 
the country.152 Congress acted, in part, on this advice when it 
adopted the Edmunds-Tucker Act in 1887. Section 15 of that Act 
dissolved the Perpetual Emigrating Fund Company and forbade the 
territorial legislature from acting in any fashion to encourage immi­
gration into Utah.153 In 1891 Congress again acted, adding
147. See L. A r r in g to n ,  supra note 62, at 97-108.
148. Id. at 99.
149. An 1881 essay in Harper's Magazine stated that Mormonism “is an institution so abso­
lutely un-American in all its requirements that it would die of its own infamies within twenty 
years, except for the yearly infusion of fresh serf blood from abroad.” See Mulder, Immigra­
tion and the “Mormon Question An International Episode, 9 W. Pol. Q. 416, 423-24 (1956).
150. See Mulder, supra note 149, at 428.
151. 7 J. R ic h a rd so n , supra note 103, at 356.
152. Id. at 362.
153. See 24 Stat. 637 (1887).
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polygamists to the list of classes excluded from the country.154
Congressional legislation, however, was only one of many tools 
used to discourage Mormon immigration. In Utah, the Mormon con­
trolled probate courts freely granted naturalization to immigrants. In 
1886, Thomas J. Drake, an Associate Justice of the Utah Supreme 
Court sitting as a district court judge in Provo, Utah, barred this pro­
cedure. He further ruled that all prior naturalizations granted by the 
probate courts were null and void.155
Similarly, in 1870 Chief Justice James B. McKean, presiding over 
the district court in Salt Lake City, ruled that a mere belief in polyg­
amy was sufficient grounds for refusing to naturalize an alien regard­
less of whether the applicant was involved in its practice.156 McKean 
failed to cite any precedent for his arbitrary holding, basing his deci­
sion on his interpretation of the naturalization statute. But McKean^ 
ruling required more of applicants than was required of natural bom 
citizens, an open denial of belief in polygamy.
Finally, in 1889 Justice Thomas J. Anderson denied citizenship 
to foreign-born Mormons because the religious covenants adminis­
tered for the Endowment House required them to pledge allegiance to 
the Mormon Church’s laws above and against those of the United 
States.157 After the Church renounced polygamy in 1890, Chief Jus­
tice Charles S. Zane ruled that foreign-born Mormons could be 
naturalized.158
B. Disestablishment of the Church: The Assault on Mormon
Economic Power
In its early years, the Church’s leaders harbored a deep distrust 
of lawyers and the formalities of the law. In Utah, Church leaders 
attempted to neutralize harassment through counter-use of the law. 
In 1851, the Assembly of the State of Deseret passed an ordinance 
incorporating the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. By the 
terms of this charter, the Church was granted vast powers. It could 
acquire and sell property, regulate marriages, register births and 
deaths, and make all laws, rules, and adjudications it deemed neces­
154. See section 1, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084 (1891); Mulder, supra note 149, at 427.
155. See Mulder, supra note 149, at 429.
156. See In re Sandberg & Horsley, reported in Deseret News, Oct. 19, 1870, at 436; 5 B. 
R o b e rts , supra note 41, at 386-87.
157. See Mulder, supra note 149, at 431.
158. Id. at 432.
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sary. It was also not subject to legal review.159
Having been legally endowed with all necessary powers, the 
Church was presumably freed from petty legal challenges. Armed 
with these powers, it became deeply involved in members’ economic 
lives. It established itself as a major business interest in Utah, and 
consistent with the Church’s communal doctrines, held a major por­
tion of the Mormons’ collective wealth. These policies made the 
Church quite vulnerable to federal pressure. The seizure of Church 
property would be a devastating blow to the entire Mormon commu­
nity. The federal government did not hesitate long before it used this 
ultimate weapon. The Morrill Act of 1862 revoked the charter incor­
porating the Mormon Church, at least insofar as that charter sup­
ported or aided polygamy.160
No attempt was made to enforce the forfeiture of Church prop­
erty, but the Church took this warning seriously even though the Act 
was generally believed unconstitutional. To bring themselves into 
what they believed to be a technical compliance with the Act, the 
Mormons initiated a policy of placing property in the hands of indi­
vidual Church leaders as trustees-in-trust.161
With the 1887 Edmunds-Tucker Act, Congress told the Church 
to abandon the practice of plural marriage or face destruction. The 
mechanism of destruction was to be confiscation of Church property. 
Section 13 of the Act directed the Attorney General of the United 
States to institute proceedings pursuant to the Morrill Act of 1862 to 
confiscate all Church real estate in excess of $50,000 in value.162 Con­
gressional legislation specified that only the Church’s real property 
was subject to seizure; but because the Morrill Act arguably revoked 
the Church’s charter in its entirety, the Church no longer existed as a 
body capable of holding property in the eyes of the law. Thus, such 
personal property as stocks, livestock, and furniture were left own­
erless and forfeited to the state. Anticipating passage of the Ed­
munds-Tucker Act, Mormon leaders increased their efforts to place 
the Church’s property beyond the reach of the federal government. 
On July 30, 1887, the United States Attorney for Utah initiated pro­
ceedings before the territorial supreme court to dissolve the Church 
corporation and to recover all property held by the Church except for
159. United States v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 15 P. 473, 474-75 (Utah 
1887).
160. See section 2, 12 Stat. 501 (1862).
161. See L. A rr in g to n ,  supra note 62, at 356.
162. See 24 Stat. 637 (1862).
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any real property acquired prior to 1862 and valued at less than 
$50,000. As in the Reynolds polygamy trial, the Mormons overesti­
mated the readiness of the courts to accept their legal arguments. But 
unlike the consequences of Reynolds, the property confiscations were 
a death blow.
In the first challenge to the Edmunds-Tucker Act’s seizure provi­
sions, United States v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,163 
the Mormons argued that the territorial charter given to the Church 
constituted a right that Congress could not constitutionally nullify. 
Relying on the landmark case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward164 
for the proposition that the charter of a private corporation was a 
contract between the state and the corporation, the Mormons argued 
that their right to acquire and hold property was a vested, contractual 
right that could not be impaired. This argument was rejected. The 
court rather vaguely suggested that a legislature could not properly 
delegate so broad a range of powers as the Mormon Church was 
granted in its charter.
More convincingly, Dartmouth College had concerned the invio­
lability of contracts made by states as sovereign authorities. Utah was 
not a state. Under its enabling act, Utah’s territorial legislature acted 
subject to Congress’ acquiescence. Congress could nullify any act of 
the territorial legislature. Thus, the court concluded, the charter gave 
the Church no vested rights but merely allowed it to exercise the enu­
merated powers “during the pleasure of Congress.”165
Against this, the Mormons raised an ingenious argument. In the 
Morrill Act in 1862, of course, Congress annulled the Church’s char­
ter; but, the Mormons argued, only insofar as it furthered or sup­
ported polygamy. By implication, therefore, Congress approved of all 
portions of the Church’s charter that did not support polygamy.166 
The court rejected this analysis and held that any corporate powers of 
the Church not negated by the Morrill Act were nullified by section 
17 of the Edmunds-Tucker Act.167
The court also noted that under common law rules, a corpora­
tion’s officers and agents cease to have any right to the use or benefit 
of corporate property when the corporation is dissolved. The court 
therefore appointed Frank H. Dyer, United States Marshall in Utah,
163. 15 P. 473 (Utah 1887).
164. 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
165. See Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 15 P. at 478.
166. Id. at 478-79.
167. Id. at 479-81.
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as receiver to take control of and manage the Church’s assets.168 Not 
surprisingly, Dyer’s tenure was stormy. Dyer vigorously pursued hid­
den Mormon assets, and the Mormons resisted. Many of the re­
ceiver’s claims were compromised; and in lieu of surrendering 
property, the Church agreed to pay the receiver nearly a quarter of a 
million dollars.169 What Dyer recovered represented only about one- 
third of the Church’s total assets.170
In 1889, an appeal of the validity of the Edmunds-Tucker Act’s 
provisions for dissolving the Church and seizing its property reached 
the United States Supreme Court.171 The arguments of the Church’s 
attorneys displayed a clear political realism. They made no argu­
ments based on the free exercise of religion. Instead, the Mormons 
argued for the sanctity of contract: the Church’s charter was a con­
tract that Congress could not lawfully break by revoking the charter. 
In the Morrill Act and before, Congress implicitly recognized that 
charter. Even if Congress were allowed to wrongfully break that con­
tract, no precedent or rationale existed for seizing the Church prop­
erty. Instead, if the corporation were to be dissolved, its property 
rightfully reverted to the Church’s membership.
The Court rejected each piece of the argument in turn. Congress’ 
power to legislate for the territories was reaffirmed. Although the 
grant of powers to the Church was lawful when made by the Utah 
Legislature, it remained so only as long as Congress acquiesced. The 
property held by the Church was, or should have been, donated for 
public and charitable purposes. Instead, the Church employed it to 
promote polygamy. By depriving the Church of its property, then, 
Congress directed that property to its proper end, and furthered Con­
gress’ policy of blocking the spread of polygamy.172 As legal prece­
dent, the Court elaborately outlined the ancient doctrine of cy pres. 
Under this legal principle, if a charitable trust could not be fulfilled 
according to its terms, the state would apply the trust property to 
those charitable uses that most nearly approximated the original pur­
pose of the grant. By analogy, the Mormons’ continued unlawful ad­
herence to polygamy made a return of Church property to the 
members improper. Because the original purpose of Church dona-
168. Id. at 482-83; L. A rr in g to n ,  supra note 62, at 368.
169. See L. A rr in g to n ,  supra note 62, at 371.
170. Id.
171. See The Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United 
States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
172. Id. at 43-50.
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tions could not be accomplished lawfully, the property should then be 
applied to other charitable goals.
Although rejected, the Mormons’ arguments were not without 
effect. The Court’s decision was a close one, with four justices dis­
senting. Accepting that Congress had the power to legislate for the 
territories, the dissenters argued that Congress “is not authorized 
under the cover of that power to seize and confiscate the property of 
persons, individuals, or corporations, without office found, because 
they may have been guilty of criminal practices.”173
Recognizing that the original decree might need to be modified 
slightly, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the territorial court 
for further consideration. The Utah Supreme Court undertook to de­
termine specifically how to dispose of the property, but before this 
issue could be resolved, the Church officially renounced polygamy in 
October 1890. That action created a powerful claim for the courts to 
abandon a meaningless effort to seize Church property. However, de­
spite a vigorous dissenting opinion, the Utah Supreme Court refused 
to abandon the forfeiture proceedings and created a trustee to apply 
Church property “to the support and aid of the poor of the church, 
and to the building and repairing of its house of worship.”174
With the judiciary unable and unwilling to return most Church 
property, Congress finally closed the book on federal efforts to destroy 
the Mormon religion. In 1893, Utah’s congressional delegate, Joseph 
L. Rawlins, introduced a resolution directing the return of the 
Church’s personal property. With minor amendments the resolution 
passed Congress, and on January 10, 1894, what was left of the 
Church’s personal property was returned. On June 8, 1896, the 
Church’s real estate was returned.175
In the battle of wills between the Church and the federal govern­
ment, the government was victorious. It suppressed polygamy and 
crippled the Church’s political, social, and economic power in the ter­
ritory. Faced with a choice between a principled commitment to po­
lygamy and survival as an organization, the Church chose to survive.
IV. Conclusion 
A central feature of the nineteenth century Mormon experience
173. Id. at 67.
174. The Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United 
States, 31 P. 436 (Utah 1890).
175. See L. A rr in g to n ,  supra note 62, at 378.
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was its concept of Zion, a community of Saints where God and His 
people could dwell together in harmony. The Mormons were from 
the beginning a gathered people. Identifying powerfully with ancient 
Israel of the Old Testament, Mormons “gathered” first to Kirtland, 
Ohio; later to Jackson County, Missouri; and then Nauvoo, Illinois. 
They finally found sanctuary in the Great Basin. Protected by the 
Rocky Mountains, their society followed a unique path of develop­
ment until the world caught up with them and then swallowed and 
assimilated them.
